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INTRODUCTION

HE Special Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws1 which drafted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code proceeded on the basic assumption
that the pricing of credit should be determined by free and
vigorous competition in the marketplace and not by governmental fiat.- In structuring the Code to comply with this
philosophy, the draftsmen provided for relatively free entry
into the consumer credit market and rate ceilings sufficiently
Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; A.B. 1963, Princeton University; J.D. 1970, Cornell University.
1The full title of the Special Committee is the "Special Committee on
Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury."
*

2 Prefatory Note to UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE (1969 Revised Final

Draft) [hereinafter cited and referred to as UCCC].
239
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high so as to permit the forces of the marketplace to work their
will.3 At the same time, however, the draftsmen recognized
the need for certain minimal controls in order to effect a balance between the relative bargaining positions of consumer
and creditor. Thus, they provided for firm but not crippling
restrictions on creditors' rights and remedies, enhancement of
debtors' rights and remedies and a wide variety of administrative powers to enable effective enforcement of the Code
4
provisions.
Taken together, the provisions designed to foster competition and those designed to effect an adjustment of bargaining
power between consumer and creditor represent, according to
the draftsmen, a delicate "balance" which, if upset, could prevent the price of money from reaching its optimum level. ' ,
The purpose of this article is to examine whether or not this
balance has been preserved by the legislatures of each of the six
states in which the Code has been adopted to date."
I.

FREE ENTRY

Traditionally, the consumer credit market has been segmented by the existence of many separate statutes, each regulating supposedly distinct types of credit grantors, as well as
kinds and amounts of credit.- Pursuant to the underlying philosophy of the Code, the draftsmen concluded that the price of
credit would be more apt to reach its optimum level if this
traditional segmentation of each creditor type into a special
legal-business pigeonhole were eliminated, thus permitting all
types of creditors to compete freely in the consumer credit
market.8 Thus, the Code as promulgated provides no entry
3 Id.

at 20.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 21.
6 Colorado (1971), Idaho (1971), Indiana (1971), Oklahoma (1969), Utah
(1969), and Wyoming (1971).
7 Johnson, Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, HARV. Bus. REV., JulyAug. 1968, at 122. Prior to the enactment of the UCCC in Colorado, for
example, the following separate statutes imposed varying requirements
upon asscrted lenders and sellers depending upon the article sold or
the type and amount of the loan or lender: 1913 Loan Law (secured
loans over $1500 at more than 12 percent), Consumer Finance Act
(secured or unsecured loans under $1500 at 12 percent or more), Retail
Installment Sales Act (installment sales of automobiles where purchasemoney security interest is retained by the seller or third party financer),
Personal Property Installment Sales Act (retail installment sales of personal property other than motor vehicles), Industrial Bank Act (licensing of industrial banks), and Colorado Insurance as Security for Loans
statute (sales of credit life insurance). Clark, The Revolution in Consumer Credit Legislation, 45 DENVER L.J. 679, 680-86 (1968).
8 Prefatory Note, supra note 2, at xix. It is hoped by those working to
eccnomically develop the ghetto that the Code's free entry provisions
will prove useful for this specialized purpose. See, e.g., PosrNoN STATE-
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restrictions to tile retail credit market and only minimal entry
restrictions to the lending market. Specifically, sections 3.201
and 3.501 of the Code permit lenders to make consumer loans
at a rate not exceeding 18 percent per year without obtaining a
license. Lenders who extend loan credit at a rate in excess
of 18 percent are required by section 3.502 to obtain licensesunless they are "supervised financial organizations" already
subject to supervision by a state or federal agency.' However,
licensing requirements are much less stringent than under most
existing laws. Thus, a licensee, under section 3.502, need obtain
only one license to operate one- or more offices,"0 whereas
separate licenses for multiple locations are often required under
existing law. The Administrator, under section 3.503, in ruling
on a license application, is to apply a standard of the "financial
responsibility, character and fitness" of the individual applicant
rather than the more restrictive, subjective test of promoting
the "convenience and advantage" of the community currently
used in the majority of states." The latter test is at best difficult to meet since it usually requires the applicant to substantiate, at a public hearing, the need for more credit facilities
in the area, and other lenders customarily appear to rebut the
2
applicant's evidence.1'
Opposition to the Code's free entry
primarily from most commercial banks
companies. Commercial banks in many
with respect to physical location, by state

philosophy has come
and some small loan
states are restricted,
branch banking laws,

and otherwise by state and federal banking codes intended to
protect depositors. Many bankers feel that as a result it is impossible for banks to compete in the consumer credit market
with less stringently regulated creditors.'" The small loan companies have been concerned that their present position as the
dominant lender of small amounts to consumers will be eroded.
These concerns have resulted, in the six states in which the
MENT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION AND OFFICE
OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY/LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR TASK FORCE,

adopted by resolution at the NLADA Convention on November 1, 1968.
'This class of lender typically includes persons authorized to make loans
and receive deposits or their equivalent, such as commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. UCCC
§ 1.301(17), Comment.
UCCC § 3.502, Comment 3.
1 See Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code:
An Economist's View,
54 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 512 (1969).
12 Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A
Public Learning Process, 23
Bus. LAW. 931, 940-41 (1968).
13 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
AN

ANALYSIS OF

CREDIT CODE

THE ECONOMIC

1-3 (Nov. 1968).
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been enacted, in two general types of limitations upon
entry principle: (1) so-called "brick walls" between
and credit selling operations; (2) more stringent
14
requirements.

A.

Brick Walls
"Brick wall" amendments have been adopted in Oklahoma,
Colorado, and Idaho. 15 The term "brick wall" comes from the
fact that these amendments are designed to keep sellers out
of the loan business by permitting sales creditors, even though
licensed, to make direct small loans only if a "brick wall" is
maintained between selling and lending operations such that
the customer must enter separate doors to obtain a loan or
buy goods. To the extent that these amendments keep certain
credit grantors out of one segment or another of the consumer credit market, they represent a substantial restriction
16
upon the Code's free entry principle.
Only Utah has adopted the Code's free entry provisions as promulgated
by the National Conference. Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates,
Profits and Competition, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 313, 326 (1970). However, a
last minute Senate floor effort to amend § 3.503 (2) to limit free entry
by requiring lenders to show assets of $25,000 nearly succeeded. Bennett,
The Political History of the UCCC in Utah, 23 PEas. FIN. L.Q. 75, 78
(1969).
15 The Oklahoma provision is as follows:
A licensee who is authorized to make supervised loans under
this Part shall not engage in the business of making sales of
goods at any location where supervised loans are made, except
the sale of insurance in connection with the making of loans.
The word "location" as used in this section means the entire
space in which supervised loans are made and said location must
be separated from any location in which merchandise is sold or
displayed by walls which may be broken only by a passageway
to which the public is not admitted.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 3.512 (Supp. 1971). This and similar amendments to the Colorado and Idaho Codes have been incorporated in
§ 3.512, which in the UCCC as promulgated merely provides that a
licensee may carry on other business at a location where he makes
supervised loans unless he does so for the purpose of evading or violating the Code.
16 The justification often heard for these amendments is that without the
"brick wall" prohibition against dual business arrangements, there
is nothing to prevent credit sellers from altering the form of sales
transactions to resemble loan transactions for the purpose of escaping
the operation of those consumer protection provisions applicable only
to sales (e.g., §§ 2.403 and 2.404 restricting the operation of the doctrine
of holder in due course and waiver of defense clauses; § 5.103, imposing
restrictions upon deficiency judgments). However, this is a spurious
argument inasmuch as evasive conduct of the type described is prohibited by UCCC § 3.512 ("A licensee may carry on other business at a
location where he makes supervised loans unless he carries on other
business for the purpose of evasion or violation of the Act.").
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, accompanying the "brick
wall" amendment in each of the states where it has been adopted is an
exemption for lender (bank) credit cards. Thus, bank credit cards,
which are specifically designated to compete with retail sales credit
cards, may be used to obtain both sales credit and loans, while retail
sales credit cards may be used only to obtain sal~s credit.
14
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B.

Licensing
Although no state in which the Code has been enacted has
inserted the old convenience and advantage requirement for
lenders, the Code's relatively simple licensing prerequisites have
been made more difficult to comply with in several states. In
Oklahoma, for example, a lender desiring to make loans at a
rate in excess of 10 percent per year (rather than the 18 percent per year set by the draftsmen) must obtain a license. 17
Moreover, if he maintains multiple locations, a separate license
is required for each.' s The test to be applied by the Administrator in issuing or denying a lender's license has been tightened by addition of the requirements that an applicant must
demonstrate that he has "experience" and "general fitness such
as to command the confidence of the public and warrant the
belief the business will be operated lawfully and fairly," that
he has available for operation of each licensed office net assets
of at least $25,000, that he has posted a bond in an amount up
to $5,000 for the first license and up to $1,000 for each additional license and that he has submitted with the application
for a license $200 for an investigation fee and $100 for each
license as his annual fee for the current calendar year.''
In the Idaho version of the Code other licensing requirements were added. Existing licensees in the community must
be notified of a pending license application, and they have the
right to file objections. 2" A licensee may not change his location unless he has given the Administrator 15 days prior notice,
and a change of location of more than 5 miles outside the original municipality is prohibited, as are loans by licensees at any
other place or under any other name than that stated in the
2
license. '
The National Conference has concluded that the practical
effect and intent of these amendments is to restrict the making
7

tit. 14A §3.501(1) (Supp. 1971). In Wyoming and
Indiana, the licensing level was lowered to 10 percent, and in Colorado
to 12 percent. However, all loans over 10 percent are not "supervised
loans" under the Indiana amendments. Loans over 18 percent remain in
the separate category of "supervised loans" for purposes of certain provisions designed to be applicable only to high-rate loans-e.g., § 3.514
governing the terms of over 18 percent loan agreements with respect
to attorney's fees.
I8Id. § 3.504. A separate license for each location is also required in Colorado and Idaho. See Colo. Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 207, § 73-3-503 and
IDAHO CODE § 28-33-503 (Supp. 1971). The potential problems in requiring a separate license for each location are manifold. For example, must
a travel card issuer which makes loans on its card obtain a license for
each place of business where the card is honored?
1"' OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A §§ 3.503, 3.504. (Supp. 1971).
20 IDAHO CODE § 28-33-503 (Supp. 1971).
"1Id.
1 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
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of consumer loans to established lenders such as banks and
small loan companies by making it more difficult to enter the
lending market..2 2 This of course is an abrogation of the underlying Code philosophy of free competition.
II. RATE CEILINGS
The philosophy of the draftsmen with respect to interest
rates is that there should be rate ceilings but not rate fixing,
and that actual rates will, in response to the forces of competition, establish themselves below the rate ceilings.23 Unfortunately, neither the philosophy nor the ample ceilings recommended by the National Conference 4 have met with widespread
acceptance in the legislatures of tne six states which have
enacted the Code. In fact only Utah has preserved the rate
5
structure recommended by the draftsmen.2
22 NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

STATE

LAWS,

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES, CONSUMER CREDIT,
SMALL LOANS AND USURY, PROPOSED "FREEDOM OF ENTRY" AMENDMENTS
TO UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODESPONSORS REPLY 6 (Dec. 1968).

23 Prefatory Note supra note 2, at xx.

"The preponderance of evidence
indicates that rates do not, in fact, move to the ceiling, except in the
small-loan field." Johnson, Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAW. 777, 781
(1971). In Utah, where the maximum schedule on revolving credit sales
was adopted, competition has apparently kept the rates well below the
permissible ceilings.

REPORT BY THE UTAH STATE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
UTAH ON THE USE OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN UTAH 77-78 (Nov. 1970).

With respect to personal loans, one expert has concluded that there
is relatively little correlation between rate ceilings and the pricing
policies of banks, and that price is in fact competitively determined.
Smith, Pricing Policies on Consumer Loans at Commercial Banks, 25
J. FINANCE 517, 519 (1970).
24 Except for revolving sales credit, the rate ceilings proposed by the
National Conference are the same for both loans (including bank credit
cards) and credit sales; 36 percent per year on amounts of $300 or less,
21 percent on the next $700, and 15 percent on amounts over $1000, or an
alternative flat rate of 18 percent on the entire outstanding balance.
UCCC §§ 2.201, 3.508. For revolving sales credit only, the rates differ;
2 percent per month on an unpaid balance of $500 or less, and 1
percent on that portion of the balance over $500. Id. § 2.207.
25 In Colorado, the National Conference's ceilings on installment loans were
not altered, but the ceiling on revolving loans was dropped to 18 percent
per year. Ch. 207, § 73-3-508, [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 826. The sales rates
were lowered to annual rates of 25 percent, 20 percent and 15 percent on
closed end installment sales, and 1
percent per month, based on the
adjusted balance, on revolving credit sales. Id. §§ 73-2-201, 207. In
Idaho, the rate ceiling on revolving sales credit was lowered to 1
percent per month, and the ceiling on revolving loan credit to 14 percent per month. IDAHO CODE §§ 22-32-207 (3), 28-33-201 (4) (Supp. 1971).
The Indiana Code's ceiling on revolving sales credit was lowered to a flat
1V2 percent per month. BURNS ANN. IND. STAT. § 19-22-207 (Supp.
1971).
The maximum permissible rate in connection with closed
end installment sales and all consumer loans on amounts up to $300 was
reduced in Oklahoma from 36 percent per year to 30 percent per year
and the maximum rate in connection with revolving credit sales was
reduced to a flat 1
percent per month. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A
§§ 2.201(2), 2.207, 3.508 (Supp. 1971). In Wyoming, the maximium rate
on revolving sales credit was lowered to a flat 1/2 percent per month.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-207 (Supp. 1971).
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The attack in the state legislatures on the Code's rate structure has focused primarily on sales rates. 26 There is no really
satisfactory explanation of why this has been the case. It may
be that retailers have traditionally been detached from the
political process, and that the more politically sophisticated
lender groups have simply been more effective in the legislative arena in combating the current tendency to legislate the
price of credit. It has also been suggested that accounting
methods used by retailers are at least partially responsible for
the increasing tendency of the legislatures to restrict the prices
which retailers may charge for providing credit services: the
considerable costs involved in extending credit have traditionally been included in other operating expenses, while credit
revenues have been shown separately as apparently cost-free
income.2 7 Thus, the illusion is given that retailers obtain substantial profits from credit when in fact, retailers generally do
28
no better than break even on their credit operations.
Whatever the reason for the vulnerability of retail rate
ceilings, the effects are unfortunate. Ceilings on credit rates
cannot control the cash prices of goods, nor the fixed costs
involved in extending credit which often exceed credit revenues
even at a monthly rate of 112 percent.1"' Since extension of
credit has become a matter of competitive necessity, retail
sellers appear to have no acceptable alternative but to adjust
the cash prices of goods and services in order to recoup at least
30
Thus, at
a portion of the losses involved in extending credit.

The justification often heard for higher loan than sales rates is that
sellers may adjust the prices of goods to make up the difference. Usually ignored, however, is the fact that issuers of bank credit cards, in
addition to credit revenue, receive substantial income from the "discount" received from participating merchants in the credit card plans.
•_7Johnson. Economic Effects of Price Ceilings on Consumer Credit, 25
1,

PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 81, 82 (1971).
28

A study of consumer credit ccsts in department stores conducted by
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart for the National Retail Merchants Association concluded that costs involved in extending sales credit exceeded
credit revenues by 3.41 percent of sales. On a per active customer account basis, the co-t for the stores studied was $11.35 and the service
charge revenue $7.40 annually, for a loss of $3.95 per account. NATIONAL
RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION
MENT STORE CREDIT 42 (1969).

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

OF DEPART-

In 1969, J.C. Penney Co., Inc. credit costs exceeded service charge

revenues by $23 million. Address by Kenneth S. Axelson, Vice President and Director of Finance and Administration of J.C. Penney Co.,
Inc. to the New York Society of Security Analysts. Feb. 4, 1971.
29

Id.

:I0Benfield, Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 56
A.B.A.J. 946, 949 (1970); Johnson. supra note 27, at 83.
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least to a certain extent, the cash customer will be subsidizing
31
the extension of credit to others.
In order to reduce the cost of extending credit as much as
possible, retail sellers will be forced to tighten credit-granting
criteria and reject marginal credit risks. 32 This will adversely
affect those consumers least able to buy for cash. 33 Further, by
placing retail credit at a competitive disadvantage with loan
credit, the more necessitous consumers will be compelled to
turn to the higher lending rates."
Thus, while lower rate ceilings would appear to be in the
interest of debtors, the exact opposite seems to be true. This is
31 In November of 1968, the voters of Washington State adopted Initiative

245 lowering the retail credit service charge rate ceiling from 18 percent
per year to 12 percent per year. One of the effects unearthed by a study
conducted by the University of Washington Graduate School of Business Administration was that, in one form or another, prices were raised
as a result of Initiative 245. Where these price increases were across
the board and not just on "credit sensitive" items, the net effect was to
impose some of the costs of credit programs upon cash buyers. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
THE IMPACT OF A CONSUMER CREDIT INTEREST LIMITATION LAW WASHINGTON STATE: INITIATIVE 245 at 65 (1970).

For similar conclusions as to the effects of a 10 percent limitation
on service charges in Arkansas, see G. LYNCH, CONSU-MER CREDIT AT
TEN PER CENT SIMPLE: THE ARKANSAS CASE, (College of Business, University of Arkansas 1969).
32 Benfield, supra note 30, at 948.
33 As noted by Professor Robert Braucher, now a Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and a member of the Special Committee
which drafted the UCCC, not only will cash buyers subsidize the extension of credit to credit buyers, but also some less credit worthy customers will be ineligible for revolving sales credit and will be forced to
pay higher installment sale or small loan rates:
... But the latest study of costs indicates that most stores, particularly small stores, lose money on revolving charge accounts
at present rates. This means in most cases that cash customers
are paying in cash prices part of the cost of supplying credit
to revolving charge customers. If we squeeze revolving charge
rates too hard, some customers will be shifted to higher installment sale or small loan rates.
Statement by Professor Robert Braucher, Hearings Before the Sub-

comm. on Consumer Affairs of the Hcuse Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. on Consumer Credit Regulation (Proposed
Uniform Consumer Credit Code), Part A. at 191 (1969).
Unresolved is the question whether extensicn of credit to the very
poor is desirable at all. See Felsenfeld, supra note 12, at 944-46, in which
it is suggested that government credit facilities of some type may be the
answer. However, it is clear that those least able to afford credit should
not be compelled to subsidize the extension of credit to more affluent
consumers by having to pay higher prices for goods purchased for cash
or to seek credit at higher rates in the legal small loan market or at
exorbitant rates in the illegal market. See also M. GOUDZWAARD, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CHARGES ON

RETAIL INSTALLMENT

Graduate School cf Management 1971).

CREDIT

(UCLA

Those who are hurt most by

price ceilings are usually those who can least afford to be hurt- the
poor and financially weak who want credit but cannot obtain it because
no creditor can "afford" to extend credit to them because their costs of
34

investigation and probable loss are simply too great.

Washington Study, supra note 31, at 72.
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but a further illustration of the need to preserve the balance
so carefully struck by the draftsmen.
III.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

Recognizing that stimulation of creditor competition would
not, by itself, assure the debtor a continuous flow of inexpensive
credit on a fair and equitable basis, the draftsmen of the Code
sought to bring about an adjustment of bargaining power between consumer and creditor. Thus, acting on the assumption
that debtors and creditors rarely negotiate the terms of their contracts,35 the draftsmen placed restrictions on permissible contract terms. They also mitigated some of the harsher debt collection practices and remedies, not only to afford relief to the
consumer, but also to insure that creditors extend credit in the
first instance on the basis of the applicant's credit-worthiness,
rather than in reliance upon one-sided collection remedies.
A.

Multiple Agreements

The Code prohibits creditors from utilizing multiple agree36
ments to split transactions with the "intent" to maximize rates
or to avoid disclosure.3 7 It has been argued that these Code
prohibitions are not strong enough to protect consumers from
multiple agreement abuses because it is too difficult to show
that a creditor has intentionally used multiple agreements for
the prohibited purposes. Accordingly, amendments drafted to
remove the element of intent and thus to impose strict liability
for the improper use of multiple agreements have been pro35 Whatever the process of exchange between the consumer and the prospective creditor prior to the consummation of the arrangement, the
terms of the contract itself, other than the principal amount, the method
of repayment, and in some cases the collateral required, are not the
subject of negotiations or discussions by the parties. And there is no
reason to expect that they will become so. The contract is a standard
printed form containing appropriate blank spaces. Neither the consumer
nor the creditor's respresentative is qualified to negotiate about any of
the printed contract terms and, in the latter case, not authorized to do
so. Although disclosure emphasizing rates may affect costs, no amount
of disclosure or stimulation of creditor access to the market is likely
to change the pattern of contract negotiations for most other contract
terms. Curran & Fand, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 49 NEB. L. REV. 727, 739 (1970). See also James, Holder in Due
Course and Other Prohibitions on Agreements, 26 Bus. LAw. 881, 886
(1971).
36 Restrictions on the use of multiple agreements are necessary because of
the graduated rate ceiling structure of the Code. Sellers or lenders might
arbitrarily divide a transaction into two or more agreements for lesser
amounts in order to generate higher rates. UCCC § 2.402, Comment 1.
3T Here the multiple concern is that a seller will employ multiple agreements in order to keep the amounts financed under each agreement low
enough to fall within the minimum charge provisions of § 2.306(2)(k)
which excuse the seller from having to disclose an annual percentage
rate. UCCC § 2.402, Comment 2.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL, 48

posed 38 and even adopted in Colorado. As amended, sections
2.402, 3.409 and 3.509 of the Colorado Code provide that any
use of multiple agreements which would "result" in obtaining
a higher rate of finance charge than otherwise permitted, or in
avoiding disclosure, is unlawful. 39 Added to sections 2.402 and
3.409 in Colorado is the presumption that the prohibition against
the use of multiple agreements is violated where a transaction
40
is divided between a husband and wife.
Legislating strict liability in this area could have the unfortunate effects of introducing undesirable rigidity, from the
point of view of both creditors and debtors, into credit transactions and of unnecessarily exposing creditors to liability for
technical violations. In sales transactions, for example, appliances and other "big ticket" items are customarily sold under
installment contracts in order to permit the seller to retain a
security interest in, and otherwise maintain control of, more
expensive goods. A department store customer might well make
larger purchases under such a closed end plan and at the same
time maintain a revolving charge account for less expensive
items. Or, a husband could make an installment purchase
independent of his wife's revolving charge account purchases.
In these situations, there would be no "intent" on the part of
the store to obtain a higher credit service charge, but this could
well be the "result." While a single store might be able to
insure that its customers do not make purchases under multiple
accounts, larger chains would find such control virtually impossible. On the loan side, a similar situation could unintentionally "result" where single borrowers, or a husband and wife
independently, take out separate loans from different branches
of the same consumer finance company. A higher finance
charge would "result," yet the violation would be entirely
unintentional.
In order to avoid technical violation of the multiple agreements provisions in the Colorado Code, creditors will be compelled to institute costly procedures to insure that consumers
are not making purchases on separate accounts or taking out
§ 2.413 (First Final Draft 1970)
(drafted by the National Consumer Law Center at Boston College Law
School).
3. It may be that the "result" amendment is applicable only to obtaining
higher rates and not to avoiding disclosure. § 2.402, provides, and
§§ 3.409 and 3.509 are similar, that a seller may not use multiple agreements which would "result in obtaining a higher credit service charge
. . . or to avoid disclosure .... ." It would seem that the element of
intent is still implicit in the phrase "to avoid dislosure."
40 The amendment was apparently derived from § 2.413 (2) of the NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT, supra note 38.
38See, e.g., NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
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independent, higher-rate loans. The result will be less flexibility in credit purchases and another increase in credit costs
which will necessarily be reflected in the price of credit. Thus,
while the Colorado amendments appear to tip the "balance"
sought to be achieved by the draftsmen in favor of the consumer, such is clearly not the case.
Holder in Due Course
The doctrine of holder in due course developed as a legitimate means of promoting the free flow of commercial paper by
shielding assignees of such paper from disputes between buyers
and sellers. As applied to consumer credit transactions, however, it has been subject to considerable abuse. 4' In order to
obtain a cash flow to finance his business, a merchant will offer
to sell consumer promissory notes to financing institutions. If
the merchandise turns out to be defective, the buyer will have
no practical means of forcing the merchant to correct the defect
since his payments are now made to the financing institution,
which is not subject to the buyer's personal defenses against
the merchant. 42 The buyer must continue to make his payments
and, if the merchant is unwilling to correct the defect, to seek
time-consuming and often prohibitively expensive legal relief.
B.

On the theory that the assignee financing institution is in a
better position to police sellers of inferior merchandise or service than the presumably unsophisticated consumer buyer, the
Code attacks the doctrine, in the context of consumer credit
sales and consumer leases only,4 on two fronts. Section 2.403
prohibits the use of negotiable instruments in consumer credit
sales or consumer leases and makes it impossible for financers
buying consumer paper to qualify as holders in due course
For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of holder in due course and
its contractual prcgeny, the waiver of defense clause, see Comment,
The Role of Cnt-Off Devices in Consumer
Consumer Protection Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 505.
42 Clark, supra note 7, at 698.
43 The UCCC does not restrict the use of negotiable instruments in consumer loans. Since extensicn of credit pursuant to a lender credit card
is a "loan" (M 3.104. 3.106), the doctrine of holder in due course is left
untouched with respect to purchases pursuant to bank credit cards.
Section 2.407 of The National Consumer Act, supra note 38, seeks to
prevent circumvention of the elimination of holder in due course by
making the lender subject to the consumer's claims and defenses in
"connected" sale and loan situations. A similar result may have been
reached in Colorado by an amendment to § 2.104. "Consumer credit
sale" is defined in part in the Colorado Code to be a sale in which
"credit is granted or arranged by a person who regularly engages as a
seller in credit transactions of the same kind." If the underlined amendatory language converts a direct consumer loan "arranged" by a seller
into a consumer credit sale, then the provisions of Article 2, including
§ 2.403, apply to the transaction.
41
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except in the unusual situation where second or third takers
may not know of an instrument's consumer origin. 4 4 To complement this prohibition, section 2.404 offers alternative sections
restricting the efficacy of contractual waivers of claims and
defenses which the buyer may assert against the seller. Alternative A makes such waivers completely ineffective and subjects the financing institution which buys consumer paper to
all claims and defenses which the buyer may assert against the
seller. The assignee's liability, however, is restricted to the
amount owing at the time the claim or defense is asserted, and
the buyer may assert his claim or defense only as a matter of
defense or setoff. Alternative B requires the buyer to inform
the financing institution of any defense arising within 3 months
of the assignment of the paper; 45 in the absence of such notification by the buyer, a contractual waiver of defense is effective to bar the buyer from asserting defenses against the financing institution arising during the 3-month period. 46
These sections have probably generated more debate among
interest groups affected by the Code than any other provision.
Consumer interests have naturally promoted Alternative A of
section 2.404 since Alternative B continues the limited effectiveness of waiver of defense clauses. 47 Financing institutions,
on the other hand, have strongly opposed Alternative A, and
have sought further limitations upon Alternative B, because of
the burdens imposed upon them with respect to policing the
practices of sellers from whom they purchase consumer paper. 4
Of the six states in which the Code has been enacted to
date, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming have adopted Alternative B of section 2.404 but each has reduced the 90-day time
period within which contract defenses must be raised to 60 days,
44 See

UCCC § 2.403, Comment.

UCCC § 2.404(1) requires the assignee to give the buyer or lessee notice
of the assignment of the contract. The 3-month period runs from the
mailing of this notice.
46 Under UCCC § 2.404(1), a waiver of defense agreement, assuming the
required notice of assignment has been mailed to the buyer, "is enforceable only with respect to claims or defenses which have arisen before
the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed." UCCC § 2.404,
Comment. Claims or defenses arising after the 3-month period are
apparently not barred by the waiver of defense agreement.
47 See Hogan, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. LAW. 159,
160-61 (1969). Alternative B is considered unacceptable by the Joint
Public Defenders and Legal Aid National Task Force. NLADA and
OEO/LSP Position Statement, supra note 8.
48 As a practical matter, the financing institution may avoid "policing" by
taking the paper on a recourse basis or pursuant to a repurchase agreement, and by requiring reserves of the seller. However, reserves would
presumably be based upon contingent liabilities and could restrict the
amount of capital which the financing institution would be willing to
make available to the seller.
45

STATE VARIATIONS

OF THE UCCC

30 days, and 45 days respectively. Colorado attempted to adopt
a form of Alternative B, with questionable success. 49 Utah
adopted Alternative A. Idaho adopted significantly expanded
versions of both section 2.403 and section 2.404, effectively
abolishing the doctrine of holder in due course in the context of
consumer credit sales and consumer leases.5' 1
The National Conference obviously anticipated significant
4) In the Colorado Code, §§ 2.403 and 2.404 as promulgated by The National

Conference have been deleted entirely. The Colorado version of 2.403
(1) requires the seller or lessor in a consumer credit sale or consumer
lease to print the words "consumer paper" on the instrument and provides that the instrument as thus labeled is a negotiable instrument
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Colorado Uniform Commercial
Code 90 days after the date of the instrument. Section 2.403(2) of
the Colorado Code provides that the assignee cf paper arising out of a
consumer credit sale or lease is subject to all claims and defenses of the
buyer, up to and including the amount owing to the assignee at the time
the claim or defense is asserted, regardless ef whether or not the agreement contains a waiver of defense clause and regardless of whether or
not the seller or lessor has properly labeled the instrument as "consumer
paper."
The 90-day period at the end of subsection 2.403(1) was evidently
an attempt to limit suspension of the holder in due course doctrine to
a 90-day period following the transaction, similar to the limitation in
Alternative B, but to permit free operation of the doctrine thereafter.
However, subsections (1) and (2) are in apparent conflict: Subsection
2.403(2) provides that an assignee of the rights of the seller is subject
to all claims and defenses of the buyer without any express time limitation- regardless of whether or not subsection 2.403 (1) has been complied with and notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary. Subsection
2.403(1), however, says only that an instrument shall be "negotiable"
within the meaning of Article 3 of the UCC 90 days after the date of
the instrument. A possible way to reconcile subsections (1) and (2)
is to read subsection (1) to be restricted to the suspension only of the
several attributes of UCC Article 3 except that attribute of negotiability
covered by subsection (2) which cuts off claims and defenses. However,
this reading ignores the intent of the Colorado Legislature, which was to
separately treat in subsections (1) and (2) two separate and distinct,
albeit closely related, problems. In subsection (1), the Legislature intended to restrict for 90 days the negotiability of consumer paper under
Article 3 of the UCC in order to suspend for that period the operation
of the doctrine of holder in due course in the context of consumer credit
sales or consumer leases. In subsection (2), the Legislature intended to
prohibit as a matter of public policy contractual waivers of defense
which have been widely used to circumvent whatever beneficial aspects
there are in the holder in due course doctrine - e.g., the liability of the
assignee who does not qualify as a holder in due course because he does
not take the instrument for value, in good faith and without notice of
a defense against or a claim to it. It would seem therefore, that subsections (1) and (2) should be read independently: Under subsection
(1), an assignee is not shielded from claims or defenses of the buyer
for 90 days. After 90 days the assignee is protected, but only if he
qualifies as a holder in due course under Article 3 of the UCC; under
subsection (2), contractual waivers of defense which would circumvent
the operation of subsection (1) are prohibited altogether.
.,u In the Idaho Code, the provision in § 2.403 giving holder in due course
status to the assignee in the unusual situation where the assignee does
not know of an instrument's consumer origin has been deleted. Section
2.404 has been extensively amended to make completely ineffective
waiver of defense clauses, to remove the restriction that the buyer may
assert his rights only as a matter of defense or by way of setoff and to
increase the assignee's potential liability from the amount owing at the
time the buyer's claim or defense is formally asserted to the amount
owing at the time the assignee has uotice of tle buyer's claim or defense.
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opposition to its attempt to eliminate, or at least restrict, the
use of contractual waivers of defense in consumer credit sales
and consumer leases, and therefore provided Alternative B of
section 2.404 as a compromise in those states where total elimination was politically unacceptable. Further dilution of this
compromise provision in Indiana, Oklahoma and Wyoming is
extremely unfortunate and is not in keeping with the Code's
philosophy of balancing consumer protections and creditor
default remedies. Substantial elimination of the holder in due
course doctrine in consumer credit sales and consumer leases
under section 2.403 is a futile gesture if creditors can avoid this
section merely by including waiver of defense clauses in their
contracts. Such clauses are a harsh legacy from the past and
should have no place in consumer transactions today.
C.

Cross-Collateral
Section 2.409 of the Code provides, both with respect to
consolidated debts secured by the goods sold in the underlying
sales and with respect to separate debts secured by cross-collateral, that payments are deemed "to have been first applied
to the payment of the debts arising from the sale first made,"
and that the security interests in the goods terminate automatically as the debts originally incurred with respect to each
item are paid. The section is designed to prevent the seller
from retaining a security interest in all of the goods until the
buyer's entire debt is paid. 5'
In Colorado, arguments advanced by various creditor
groups 52 resulted in substantial dilution of this allocation requirement. As amended, section 2.409 (1) of the Colorado Code
provides that, beginning with the first transaction, payments are
to be allocated to each item of collateral according to its original retirement schedule. After an item is paid for, and the security interest in it released at the request of the buyer, subsequent
payments are proportionately allocated to the retirement of the
debts arising from subsequent purchases in the same way. 53
51 If the seller consolidates debts of $100, $200, and $300 arising from sales
made in that order, the security interest in the goods purchased pursuant
to the $100 sale terminates when $100 of the consolidated debt is paid.
If the seller does not consclidate these debts but secures them by crosscollateral, he must allocate all of the buyer's payments to the $100 until
it is paid off, and so forth. UCCC § 2.409, Comment 1.
52 Primarily automobile dealers.
These groups argued that the Code's
crcss-collateral provisions would ultimately restrict credit to consumers
since creditors would be unwilling to extend substantial credit where it
could not be adequately secured, particularly where the security was of
a rapidly depreciating nature, such as automobiles.
53 Ch. 207, § 73-2-409(1), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 799.
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This revised allocation is not inconsistent with the "firstpayments-against-first-debts" rule5 4 since it does apply payments against debts first incurred, although only up to the
amount of the original payments scheduled, and therefore
should not under most circumstances permit a seller to retain a
security interest in all the goods until the entire debt is paid. '
However, the security interest in goods which have been paid
for in full does not automatically terminate; it is released only
at the request of the buyer. Imposing affirmative duties of this
sort upon the buyer appears to be contrary to the Code's basic
philosophy of achieving a new balance in debtor-creditor relationships based upon the recognition that consumers are for the
most part relatively unsophisticated vis-A-vis creditors.
D.

Referral Sales

The Code prohibits referral sales schemes wherein the
seller induces the buyer to purchase the goods, usually at an
inflated price, by offering to credit against the purchase price
a certain amount for the name of every business-generating
reference supplied by the buyer. 6 The abuse sought to be cor57
rected by the Code's drafters is one of the most pervasive.
In Indiana, this prohibition was substantially weakened by
the addition of a provision to the effect that section 2.411 is not
applicable where the seller agrees to pay or credit the buyer
for the name of each prospective purchaser furnished by the
buyer who actually submits to an interview or demonstration
the seller honors the agreements by making the appropri-if
ate payments or credits when earned. Presumably, however,
the section is still applicable where price reductions or other
.54 UCCC

§ 2.409, Comment 1.

55 The seller will, however, be able to retain a security interest for a longer

period of time. If the seller consolidates debts of $100, $200 and $300
arising from Sales made in that order, the security interest in the goods
purchased pursuant to the $100 sale will terminate, not when a total of
$100 has been paid, but when $100 has been paid toward the $100 debt
according to the original retirement schedule. Similarly, if the seller does
not consclidate the debts but secures them by cross-collateral, he is not
required to allocate all of the buyer's payments to the $100 debt until it
is paid off, but only amounts equivalent to the original payment
scheduled.
It has been suggested that this approach will assist consumers in
obtaining higher credit limits. See Hcgan, Integrating the UCCC and
the UCC- Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and Practices, 33 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 686, 698 (1968).
56 UCCC § 2.411. Agreements in violation of § 2.411 are unenforceable.
In addition, the buyer may keep the goods without paying for them or,
in the alternative, rescind the agreement, return the gcods and receive
back any payment made.
57 UCCC § 2.411, Comment 3.
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inducements are conditioned upon subsequent sales.5s
Although the Indiana amendment is an aberration which
has not yet appeared elsewhere, states considering the Code for
adoption in the future should be wary of amendments to this
provision which reduce its effectiveness in eliminating a widespread abuse.
Attorney's Fees
With respect to consumer credit sales or consumer leases
and consumer loans, sections 2.413 and 3.404 furnish alternative
provisions placing limitations on the imposition of attorney's
fees on the defaulting buyer or borrower. Alternative A of each
section prohibits altogether agreements providing for payment
of attorney's fees by the buyer or borrower on the theory that
the Code's generous rate ceilings will enable creditors to treat
attorney's fees as part of the cost of doing business. 59 Alternative B of each section, on the other hand, permits agreements
providing for the payment by the debtor of reasonable attorney's fees, but limits such fees to 15 percent of the unpaid debt
after default. This alternative rests on the theory that attorney's fees should be paid directly by the defaulting buyer or
borrower who generates the expense rather than by the creditor's non-defaulting customers who indirectly pay the cost of
doing business.60 With respect to supervised loans,6 ' the Code
prohibits agreements for the payment of attorney's fees where
62
the principal amount of the loan is $1,000 or less.
E.

In each of the six states in which the UCCC has been
enacted, stiff creditor resistance to any limitation upon attorney's fees has resulted in significant alteration of the Code provisions. In Idaho, Indiana, Utah, and Wyoming, Alternative B
has been adopted, but with the 15 percent limitation on attorney's fees removed. The same result has probably been reached
in Colorado where Alternative B was adopted with the 15 percent limitation intact, but with discretion vested in the court
to "direct" additional fees. In Oklahoma, Alternative B has
been adopted, but with an amendment to section 2.413 prohibiting attorney's fees if the "amount financed" is $1,000 or less and
the credit service charge exceeds 10 percent per year.
The section prohibits price reductions contingent upon the occurrence of
subsequent "events," which would seem to include interviews, demonstrations and sales.
59 UCCC § 2.413, Comment, Alternative A.
60 UCCC § 2.413, Comment, Alternative B.
61 "Supervised Loan" is essentially a consumer loan in which the loan
finance charge exceeds 18 percent per year. UCCC § 3.501 (3).
58

62

UCCC §3.514.
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Under previously discussed amendments to the Oklahoma
Code, all loans in which the finance charge is in excess of 10
percent are supervised loans and, when less- than $1,000, are
therefore governed by section 3.514 prohibiting attorney's fees
in connection with supervised loans of less than $1,000. Thus,
despite the tacit authorization in section 3.404 for attorney's
fees of up to 15 percent, such are prohibited by section 3.514 in
connection with supervised loans of under $1,000. 6 3 The same is
true in the Wyoming Code; all loans in which the finance
charge exceeds 10 percent are supervised loans subject to sec64
tion 3.514, which was not amended.
Section 3.514 of the Colorado Code, however, was amended
to allow attorney's fees up to 15 percent irrespective of the
principal amount of the supervised loan. Thus, even though
loans in which the finance charge exceeds 12 percent are supervised loans in Colorado, and therefore governed by section
3.514, section 3.514 is consistent with section 3.404 as adopted in
that state insofar as it permits reasonable attorney's fees up
to 15 percent of the unpaid debt after default. However, as
previously noted, section 3.404 of the Colorado Code also permits "such additional fee as may be directed by the court." This
additional fee is therefore permissible only with respect to
consumer loans in which the finance charge does not exceed
12 percent.
No amendments were made to the Idaho, Indiana, and Utah
Codes with respect to the loan finance charge of supervised
loans. Thus, section 3.514 in these states governs only those
loans in which the finance charge exceeds 18 percent. In Utah,
the $1,000 limitation in section 3.514 was, in any case, removed,
thereby permitting reasonable attorney's fees on all loans.
There is, perhaps, some justification for permitting attorney's fees in excess of 15 percent in those states where the
Code's sale or loan rates ceilings have been lowered, since these
collection fees represent a significant cost of extending credit
which cannot be recovered through credit revenues. However,
there is no justification for permitting attorney's fees in excess
of 15 percent for loans or sales with respect to which Code rates
have been preserved. To the extent that attorney's fees without
limitation are now permitted on top of ample credit revenues,
the Code's debtor-creditor "balance" has been upset.
63
64

Section 3.404, Alternative B would appear to permit attorney's fees of
up to 15 percent on all consumer loans over $1,000.
UCCC § 3.514 appears in the Wyoming version as § 3.513.
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Home Solicitation Sales

An important UCCC consumer protection is the right of a
buyer to cancel a home solicitation sale until midnight of the
third business day after the buyer has signed at his residence
an agreement or offer to purchase which complies with part
5 of article 2 . 5 To comply with the Code, the seller must furnish the buyer with a cancellation disclosure statement in the
form prescribed by section 2.503. If the buyer does exercise his
right of cancellation, the seller may retain as a cancellation fee
6
the cash down payment up to 5 percent of the cash price.
Section 2.503(2)(b) of the Oklahoma Code has been
amended to require that the notice of the buyer's right to cancel
must state that the seller, upon cancellation, may only retain
any cash down payment "not to exceed five percent (5%) of
the cash price." Similarly, the same section of the Colorado
Code has been amended to require the statement that the
seller, upon cancellation, may only retain "five percent of the
cash price but not exceeding the amount of the cash down
payment." The Code as promulgated does not make it clear in
the required cancellation disclosure statement that the seller's
right to retain the down payment is limited by the 5 percent
ceiling.6 7 These clarifying amendments are therefore desirable
since buyers ignorant of the ceiling would be understandably
reluctant to exercise their right of rescission.
Section 2.502 of the Code as promulgated provides that cancellation of a home solicitation sale occurs when the buyer gives
written notice of cancellation to the seller at the address stated
in the agreement or offer of purchase. An amendment to the
The right of cancellation under part 5 of article 2
is not to be confused with the limited right of rescission with respect to
transactions in which a security interest is taken in the debtor's home
under § 5.204. If a transaction falls within both § 2.402 and § 5.204, the
debtor may elect to proceed under either section, UCCC § 2.502,
Comment 4.
The high expenses of ghetto retailing, which are in turn reflected
in higher prices for goods and services in the ghetto, are attributable
in large part to the high personnel expenses incurred by low-income
market retailers in using door-to-door selling techniques. FTC, Eco-

65 UCCC § 2.502 (1).

NOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS 13, 19 (1968). It has been suggested that breaking the "door-to-door syndrome" would be conducive to ghetto selling at
reasonable prices, and that the Code provisions may be helpful in this

regard. See White, Consumer Credit in the Ghetto: UCCC Free Entry
Provisions and the Federal Trade Commission Study, 25 Bus. LAW. 143,
150-51 (1969).
66 UCCC § 2.503 (3).
67 The language of the Code as promulgated implies that the seller may
retain all of the cash down payment without limit: "If you cancel, the
seller may keep all or part of your cash down payment." UCCC § 2.503
(2) (b).
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Colorado Code makes the additional requirement that the written notice be mailed in a post office or in an official mailbox
from within 50 miles of the place of sale or, in the alternative,
that a wire notifying the seller of intent to rescind with a
letter following be sent within the required time period. 8 The
purpose of the amendment was to finalize home solicitation
sales within 3 days in the unlikely event that the buyer, immediately after executing an agreement of offer to purchase in
connection with a home solicitation sale, left the immediate geographical area and ultimately mailed his notice of cancellation
from some remote place. The amendment seems unfortunate in
that the situation it contemplates will be extremely rare, and
in most instances will only provide disreputable door-to-door
sellers with the argument that the buyer mailed the cancellation notice more than 50 miles from the place of sale and therefore did not comply with section 2.502.
G.

Garnishment

Garnishment of wages is a significant cause of the increasing number of consumer bankruptcies."" The reason is that
garnishment often results in the debtor's discharge from employment, thereby removing the source of income with which
the debtor might eventually pay his debts. Equally important,
of course, is the fact that wage garnishment leaves very little
with which a debtor can sustain himself and his family. The
Code attempts to remedy this situation by prohibiting garnishment before judgment, 7' placing limitations on post-judgment
garnishment, and prohibiting employers from discharging their
employees because of wage garnishments. Unfortunately,
amendments in some states have reduced the impact of the
latter two provisions.
(s Ch. 207, § 73-2-502(2), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 802.
69 Hogan, supra note 47, at 161.
7) Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) casts serious doubt
upon the validity of any ex-parte prejudgment garnishment procedure.
While noting that such procedures might be valid in "extraordinary
situations," the Ccurt. per Douglas J., held that a Wisconsin summary
prejudgment garnishment procedure violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of wages.
Section 5.104, prohibiting prejudgment garnishment, has been
adopted without change in Idaho, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. In
Colorado, an amendment prohibits, in addition to prejudgment garnishment, ex-parte forceful replevin of the debtor's gocds, except motor
vehicles, from a dwelling. In Indiana, the application of all garnishment
restrictions, including the prohibition against prejudgment garnishments, has been expanded to cover all debts of an individual and not
just those arising out of a consumer credit sale, consumer lease or consumer loan.
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Section 5.105 of the Code restricts the use of garnishment
after judgment by limiting the maximum amount of disposable
earnings which a creditor can collect in connection with a consumer debt. A creditor may not garnish more than the lesser of
25 percent of a debtor's disposable earnings for 1 week or the
amount by which the debtor's earnings exceed 40 times the federal minimum hourly wage. In Wyoming, Colorado, Oklahoma,
and Indiana, section 5.105 (2) (b) has been amended to reduce
the garnishment exemption from 40 times the minimum hourly
wage to 30 times, which is the figure used in section 303 of the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act from which section
5.105 is derived. This amendment is contrary to the conclusion
of the draftsmen of the Code that 30 times the minimum hourly
wage is an insufficient exemption.71 The National Conference
apparently found that the federal exemption scarcely leaves
enough for a family to subsist on, much less any disposable
income which might encourage a debtor to accommodate his
creditors without resorting to bankruptcy.
Section 5.106 of the Code as promulgated prohibits the discharge of an employee because of the garnishment or attempted
garnishment of his wages by a creditor. Utah, however, has
adopted the more conservative approach of section 304 of the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act which prohibits an
employee's discharge by reason of garnishment of his wages
for any one indebtedness.7 2 Thus, if the employee's wages are
garnished in connection with more than one indebtedness, discharge is permitted in Utah where it would not be under the
Uniform Code. Similarly, section 5.106 of the Oklahoma Code
has been amended to provide that a debtor can be discharged
for garnishment if the employer is served with garnishment
process issued to collect one or more judgments against the
employee on more than two occasions within 1 year.
Garnishment not only creates hardships for debtors, but is
counterproductive for creditors and society as a whole. Bankruptcy and welfare are often the only avenues open to a debtor
whose wages have been garnished and who as a result has been
discharged from employment. The Code restrictions on garnishment are designed to keep the debtor functioning in the economy, which is clearly in the best interests of both debtor and
creditor.
UCCC § 5.105, Comment 1. Assuming a minimum wage of $1.60, the
exemption amounts to only $48.00, as oppcsed to $64.00 if increased to 40
times the minimum wage.
72UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-5-106 (Supp. ]971).
71
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Deficiency Judgments

Section 5.103 places restrictions upon deficiency judgments
in consumer credit sales. The intent of the section is to prevent a seller from repossessing or voluntarily accepting surrender of the goods, selling the goods for a ridiculously low
price or buying in at the sale for a low price, and then obtaining an additional deficiency judgment for the difference between that price and the unpaid debt - with the result that the
debtor loses the merchandise and yet remains liable for the
unpaid debt. The section provides that, where the seller repossesses or voluntarily accepts surrender of goods in which he
has a security interest, and the cash price of the goods repossessed or surrended is $1,000 or less, the buyer is not personally
liable to the seller for any deficiency. In effect, in cases of
sales of $1,000 or less, the section permits the seller either to
sue for the unpaid balance or to repossess the goods, but not
both.

73

Section 5.103 in both the Wyoming and Colorado Codes has
been amended to prohibit deficiency judgments only where the
cash price of the goods is $500 or less, instead of $1,000 as in
the Uniform Code. As thus amended, the section will still
protect defaulting buyers of most appliances from deficiency
judgments, but it will not abolish deficiency judgments in connection with the sale of most automobiles wherein the abuse
is thought to be most prevalent.74 Indeed, it has been argued
that the $1,000 figure in the Uniform Code as promulgated
affords insufficient protection; 7 ' any lesser figure would therefore be undesirable.
On the other hand, it is arguable that the Code's approach
of requiring an election sweeps too broadly, and that the real
problem lies in the fact that the sale of the repossessed collateral has been subject to widespread abuse and that such
abuse can be corrected by better enforcement of the "commercially reasonable" standard of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
UCCC § 5.103, Comment 3.
74See generally Schuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of
Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969).
75 Id. at 46-47. Of the 123 case studies forming the basis of this article
in which the original price of the automobile was revealed, only 13
vehicles had cash prices of less than $1,000, and two of those had cash
prices of $995. Thus, the author concludes that the UCCC deficiency
judgment restrictions would affect less than 9 percent of all automobile
credit sales.
Section 5.211 of the National Consumer Act, supra note 38, permits
deficiency judgments only where the unpaid balance of the obligation
is $2,000 or more at the time of default.
73
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Preservation of Collateral

Section 2.208 as promulgated permits the seller, if the agreement between the buyer and seller so provides, to add to the
buyer's debt amounts paid on behalf of the buyer for insurance
for preservation of the collateral. The section also provides that
the seller must disclose to the buyer the details of any such
disbursements on the buyer's behalf.
An amendment to the Colorado Code requires that any expenditures made by the seller be reasonable to protect the risk
of loss or damage to the property and that all expenditures
made by the seller be in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. 76 These additional provisions would seem to
be implicit in the Code section as promulgated. In addition to
post-transaction disclosure by the seller, amendments to the
Colorado and Oklahoma Codes require pretransaction notice
to the buyer of his nonperformance and a reasonable opportunity for the buyer to perform.7 7 This would seem to be a
desirable amendment since it does not alter the substance of
the section but merely places a stricter burden of compliance on
the seller. On the other hand, it could be said that the requirement of such notice and opportunity unduly restricts creditors
in emergency situations where immediate action is required to
preserve the collateral. However, under these circumstances, it
would seem that the buyer's "reasonable opportunity" to perform should not leave the seller with no time to act himself i.e., what is a "reasonable opportunity" will vary with the
circumstances.
CONCLUSION

A review of the variations reflected in the six versions of
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code adopted to date reveals a
tendency among state legislatures to reject wholesale acceptance of the National Conference's recommendations and to restructure certain of the Code's key provisions. The Conference
sought to establish a balance of interests with respect to each
substantive topic in the Code, as well as an overall balance.
While this balance has not been altogether abandoned by the
state legislatures, neither has it survived unscathed the pressures incident to the legislative process.
76

77

Ch. 207, § 73-2-208(1), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 786.
reasonable" standard, in transactions governed by the
to resale by a seller follcwing rejection of goods
§ 2.706) and to disposition of collateral by a secured
(UCC §§ 9.504, 9.507).
Ch. 207, § 73-2-208(1), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 786.
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The incursions on the rate philosophy and competitive
themes, and the shortsighted resistance to the Code's consumer
protection provisions, reflect a trend which, if followed by
other state legislatures, could undermine basic UCCC principles.
Without competition, credit oligopolies will reappear and rates
will be fixed by tacit understandings at the expense of competive efficiencies favoring lower credit prices for the consumer.
This will in turn encourage Congress to follow its Federal Truth
in Lending Act-based squarely on the same principles as the
UCCC-with a comprehensive credit package which will remove the subject of consumer credit regulation entirely from
the control of the states.
To avoid this possibility state legislatures should look long
and hard at any proposed amendments to the UCCC. Above all
they should avoid the temptation to yield to interest group
demands with respect to specific provisions without first considering the effect of the proposed changes on the other provisions of the Code. Only in this way can the balance so carefully struck by the Code's draftsmen be preserved.

